«"I THINK, THEREFORE… WHO AM I?": ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE'S CLAIMS TO THE COGITO AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN SELF»
Keywords:
artificial intelligence, cogito, subjectivity, consciousness, identity, philosophy of mind, Descartes, Turing, qualia, strong AIAbstract
This article examines the philosophical foundations of the question of whether an artificial intelligence system can be the subject of the Cartesian cogito - and what this question itself changes in our understanding of human identity, consciousness, and subjectivity. Drawing on the classical Cartesian tradition, the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, analytic philosophy of mind (Chalmers, Searle, Dennett), and contemporary research in theory of mind and cognitive science, the author demonstrates that the question of AI's thinking inevitably becomes a question about the very nature of thinking as such. The article is intended for participants of international conferences on philosophy, cognitive science, and AI ethics.
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